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In a recent paper Ghirardato, Macheroni and Marinacci [4] (henceforth GMM), con-
sider a class of preferences that encompasses both the Choquet expected utility
(henceforth CEU) model of Schmeidler [10] and the multiple prior model of Gilboa
& Schmeidler [6]. For a given preference relation % from this class, they de…ne the
(generally) partial ordering %￿ to be the maximal sub-relation of % that satis…es all
the axioms of subjective expected utility (SEU) except completeness. They dub %￿
the unambiguous preference relation and show that it admits a representation in the
style of Bewley [1]: in particular, there is a utility u(￿) de…ned on the set of outcomes
X and a non-empty, compact and convex set of probability measures D de…ned on
the state space S such that for any pair of acts f and g,
f %￿ g if and only if
Z
S
u(f (s))dP (s) ￿
Z
S
u(g (s))dP (s), for all P 2 D.
The relation %￿ is complete if and only if D is a singleton in which case % equals %￿
and is SEU.
Furthermore, they establish the existence of a function ￿ (￿) that maps each act
f to a weight ￿ (f) in [0;1], such that % can be represented by the functional








u(f (s))dP (s): (1)
GMM interpret D as the decision maker’s perception of ambiguity and the weight
￿ (f) (which in general depends on the act f, being evaluated) as an index of the
decision-maker’s aversion to that ambiguity, since the larger is ￿ (f), the greater is the
weight the DM gives to the “pessimistic” evaluation of f given by minP2D
R
S u(f (s))dP (s).
An interesting subclass of these preferences is one in which the ambiguity aversion
index ￿ (￿) is constant. That is, the special case of their class of preferences for which
we can …nd a ￿ in [0;1], such that % can be represented by the functional








u(f (s))dP (s): (2)
1This representation is a special case of the well-known ￿-MEU, which has the
same functional representation








u(f (s))dP (s), (3)
except that P (a non-empty, compact and convex set of probability measures de…ned
on the state space S) need not be equal to the set D.
GMM provide an axiomatic characterization of their subclass by taking a prefer-
ence relation % that admits a representation of the form given by (1) and showing
that the associated ambiguity aversion index ￿ (￿) is constant if and only if % satis…es
the following axiom.
GMM’s Axiom 7 For all pairs of acts f;g, C￿ (f) = C￿ (g) ) f ￿ g; where
C￿ (h) = fx 2 X : y <￿ h ) y <￿ x and h <￿ y ) x <￿ yg:
To understand what this axiom entails, notice …rst that the set C￿ (f) may be
viewed as the set of certainty equivalents of f with respect to the relation <￿. If %
is not SEU then <￿ is incomplete, which in turn means that in general an act has an














Thus for a DM who satis…es this axiom, the set of certainty equivalents with respect
to <￿ contains all the information the DM uses in evaluating f. What their charac-
terization result establishes is that this dependence on the range of utilities must be
linear.
In the next section we …rst analyse the case of Hurwicz preferences, a special case
of preferences that admit representations of the form given in (3) with P equal to
the entire set of probability measures de…ned on the state space S. We show that
for ￿ 6= 0;1, the set D is a strict subset of P: Furthermore, the only members of this
2class that admit a representation of the form (2), that is, satisfy GMM’s Axiom 7,
are ones for which ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1.
We then proceed to the more general class of CEU preferences that admit an ￿-
MEU representation in the section after that and show that again the only members
of this class that admit a representation of the form (2), that is, satisfy GMM’s Axiom
7, are ones for which ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1.
2 HURWICZ PREFERENCES
For the purposes of this note we shall assume there is a …nite set of states of na-
ture S, with cardinality n. For simplicity we shall also assume that acts pay-o¤ in
utility terms, that is, an act is a function from S to R. This is without any essen-
tial loss of generality since our analysis could also be conducted in a setting where
representations involve a conventional utility function over outcomes.
For a given preference relation % from the GMM class of orderings, let D denote
the set of probabilities associated with the derived unambiguous preference relation
%￿. For each act f, set f := minP2D EP [f] and ￿ f := maxP2D EP [f]: Thus the
GMM representation (1) may be expressed as V (f) = ￿ (f)f + (1 ￿ ￿ (f)) ￿ f.
Let of : S ! f1;:::;ng be a one-to-one mapping that denotes the ordering of states
















: De…ne ￿ : f1;:::;ng ! R by the rule, ￿(i) := f ￿ o￿1
f (i). For an
act in which no two states have the same outcome, ￿(i) is then the ith best outcome
that can obtain. In particular, ￿(1) is the best outcome that can arise under f and
￿(n) is the worst.
We begin by considering the following class of preferences introduced by Hurwicz
[8] and [7]:
f <￿ g () ￿min
s2S
f (s) + (1 ￿ ￿)max
s2S
f (s) > ￿min
s2S




a (￿) denote this functional representation of %￿, we have the following
alternative ways to express this representation:
V H
￿ (f) = ￿￿(n) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(1)
= ￿ min
P2￿(S)
EP [f] + (1 ￿ ￿) max
P2￿(S)
EP [f], (5)
where ￿(S) denotes the set of probability measures on S and EP [f] =
R








￿(i) denotes the expectation of the act f with respect to the
probability measure P.
Notice that this is a polar example of the ￿-MEU representation given in (3),
with P = ￿(S). Indeed, Hurwicz introduced these preferences for situations in
which the DM has no information about the process that will determine the state of
nature. Intuitively, we would expect that her ambiguity is represented by the set of
all probability distributions over S, ￿(S), and her ambiguity-attitude is measured
by ￿ with higher values of ￿ corresponding to greater ambiguity-aversion.1 Notice
that in expression (5) the weight ￿ is allocated to the least favourable probability
distribution for the act, namely the (degenerate) distribution that places probability
one on the state in which the worst outcome in the range of the act obtains (i.e.
state o￿1
f (n) on which the outcome ￿(n) obtains). The remaining weight (1 ￿ ￿) is
allocated to the most favourable probability distribution for this act, the (degenerate)
distribution that places probability one on the state in which the best outcome in the
range of the act obtains (i.e. the state o￿1
f (1) on which the outcome ￿(1) obtains).
According to GMM, however, the perceived ambiguity of the Hurwicz preference
relation %￿ is represented by the set D, which is the convex hull of the following set
of n(n ￿ 1) probability measures,
fP￿
st 2 ￿(S), s;t 2 S;s 6= t : P￿
st (fsg) = ￿, P￿
st (ftg) = 1 ￿ ￿;P￿
st (f!g) = 0;! 6= s;tg.
1All the formal theories of ambiguity-aversion, which we are aware of, would agree that an increase
in ￿ would correspond to an increase in ambiguity-aversion, see [3] or [5].
4In …gure 1, we provide an illustration of the set D for the case of n = 3 and ￿ < 1=2.
Figure 1. The set of priors D, the convex hull of the set
fP￿
st 2 ￿(S), s;t 2 S;s 6= t : P￿
st (fsg) = ￿, P￿
st (ftg) = 1 ￿ ￿g.
for the case n = 3 and ￿ < 1=2.
To see why this set of probabilities constitutes D, notice that for any three acts
f; g and h and any ￿ 2 (0;1), it is immediate that if EP￿
st [f] ￿ EP￿
st [g] for all
s;t 2 S, s 6= t, then EP￿
st [￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)h] ￿ EP￿
st [￿g + (1 ￿ ￿)h] for all s;t 2 S,
s 6= t. In this case, for the pair of acts f and g not only is f %￿ g, but we also have
￿f +(1 ￿ ￿)h %￿ ￿g +(1 ￿ ￿)h, for all h and all ￿ 2 (0;1). Full independence holds
for this particular pair of acts. What takes a little more work to show formally, but
is readily apparent, is that if for a pair of acts ^ f and ^ g, we have ^ f %￿ ^ g but for some
pair of states s and t, s 6= t, EP￿
st [f] < EP￿
st [g], then there exists an act ^ h and a
^ ￿ 2 (0;1) for which ^ ￿^ g +
￿
1 ￿ ^ ￿
￿
^ h ￿￿ ^ ￿ ^ f +
￿
1 ￿ ^ ￿
￿
^ h. That is, for this pair of acts
we can …nd a violation of independence. To express it using GMM terminology, for
the Hurwicz preference relation %￿ we have f is unambiguously preferred to g (i.e.
5f %￿
￿ g) if and only if
￿f (s) + (1 ￿ ￿)f (t) ￿ ￿g (s) + (1 ￿ ￿)g (t), 8s;t 2 S;s 6= t.
We argued above that ambiguity was intuitively represented by ￿(S). Yet D only
coincides with ￿(S) if ￿ = 0 or 1. One would think intuitively that ￿ represents the
attitude towards ambiguity of the Hurwicz preference relation %￿ and yet D depends
on ￿.
Let us next consider how GMM’s index of ambiguity attitude applies to Hurwicz
preferences. We shall …rst consider the case n > 2. We shall treat the setting in
which there is a two-element state space separately below.
Fix a non-constant act f (that is, ￿(1) > ￿(n)). There are two cases to consider:
when ￿ is greater than or equal to 1=2 and when ￿ is less than 1=2.
1. Suppose ￿ ￿ 1=2. Then f = ￿￿(n) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(n ￿ 1) and ￿ f = ￿￿(1) +
(1 ￿ ￿)￿(2): To represent the preferences in the GMM form given in (1) we require,
￿ (f)f + (1 ￿ ￿ (f)) ￿ f = ￿￿(n) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(1).
Thus,
￿ (f)[￿￿(n) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(n ￿ 1)] + [1 ￿ ￿ (f)][￿￿(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(2)]
= ￿￿(n) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(1),
which yields
￿ (f) =
￿(￿(1) ￿ ￿(n)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿(1) ￿ ￿(2))
￿(￿(1) ￿ ￿(n)) + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿(2) ￿ ￿(n ￿ 1))
=
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿




￿(2) ￿ ￿(n ￿ 1)
￿(1) ￿ ￿(n)
.
In particular, if ￿ = 1=2, then we have ￿ (f) = ￿=(1 + ￿).
2. Suppose ￿ < 1=2. Then f = (1 ￿ ￿)￿(n)+￿￿(n ￿ 1) and ￿ f = (1 ￿ ￿)￿(1)+
￿￿(2): Now we require
￿ (f)[(1 ￿ ￿)￿(n) + ￿￿(n ￿ 1)] + [1 ￿ ￿ (f)][(1 ￿ ￿)￿(1) + ￿￿(2)]




￿(￿(2) ￿ ￿(n ￿ 1)) + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿(1) ￿ ￿(n))
=
￿￿
￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
.
While ￿ (f) depends on ￿, which intuitively measures ambiguity-attitude, it also
depends on ￿ and ￿. The variable ￿ is a measure of the di¤erence between the
second-best outcome and the worst outcome relative to the di¤erence between the
best and worst outcomes, while ￿ is a measure of the di¤erence between the second-
best and second-worst outcomes relative to the di¤erence between the best and worst
outcomes. It does not seem at all obvious to us why such variables should be relevant
for an ambiguity-attitude index.
What we can also glean from these expressions for ￿ (f) is that ￿ (￿) is a constant
function only if ￿ = 1 or if ￿ = 0. This means that if there are more than two states
then the only Hurwicz preference relations that satisfy GMM’s axiom 7 are %1 and
%0, that is, the cases of extreme pessimism and extreme optimism.
For the case of a two-element state space, we obtain ￿ (f) = 1 if ￿ > 1=2 and
￿ (f) = 0 if ￿ < 1=2. For the two-element state-space, in the GMM interpretation, ￿
determines the degree of perceived ambiguity which is greater the further away ￿ is
from 1=2. The attitude towards ambiguity is dichotomous, either extreme pessimism
or extreme optimism depending on whether ￿ is strictly greater than or strictly less
than 1=2. The preference relation %1=2 is ambiguity neutral since it corresponds
to the preference relation of an expected value maximiser who thinks each state is
equally likely.
The two-element state-space for Hurwicz preferences also illustrates GMM’s Propo-
sition 20. If the preference relation satis…es axiom 7 and so admits a representation of
the form in (2) then among all possible ￿-MEU type representations, GMM’s one is
the only one yielding a set of probability measures which represent %￿, and it yields
the smallest set of probability measures. However, as the analysis of Hurwicz prefer-
7ences for the case in which there are more than two states illustrates, the existence of
an ￿-MEU representation does not guarantee that GMM’s axiom 7 is satis…ed, and
if axiom 7 does not hold, then a representation of the form given in (2) fails to exist.
In this case, although one can always …nd the representation of the form given in (1),
this may not provide the most intuitive separation of perceived degree of ambiguity
and attitude towards ambiguity.
3 ￿￿MEU and CEU
Our analysis of Hurwicz preferences in the previous section demonstrates that not all
￿-MEU preferences satisfy GMM’s axioms. In this section we explore when GMM’s
axiom 7 holds. To do this we shall consider the family of preferences which admit
both CEU and ￿-MEU representations.
For CEU preferences, the decision weights over states used in evaluating an act
are derived from capacities.
De…nition 3.1 A capacity on S is a real-valued function ￿ on the subsets of S which
satis…es the following properties:,
1. E ￿ E0 ) ￿ (E) 6 ￿ (E0);
2. ￿ (?) = 0; ￿ (S) = 1:
Its conjugate, denoted ~ ￿ (￿), is the capacity de…ned as ~ ￿ (E) = 1 ￿ ￿ (Ec). The
capacity is said to be convex (resp. concave) if for all E;E0 ￿ S, ￿ (E [ E0) +
￿ (E \ E0) ￿ (resp. ￿) ￿ (E) + ￿ (E0).2
Given a capacity on S, the expected value of a given act with respect to that
capacity can be found using the Choquet integral.
2Notice that if the capacity ￿ is convex (resp. concave) then its conjugate ~ ￿ is concave (resp.
convex).
8De…nition 3.2 The Choquet expected value of f with respect to capacity ￿, which
we shall denote by
R





















f (i ￿ 1)
o￿i
:


























f (i ￿ 1)
o￿
,
for i = 2;:::;n. It readily follows that
R
fdv = E ^ P(f) [f] =
Pn






Furthermore, for any other act g that is comonotonic with f, that is, [g (s) ￿ g (t)][f (s) ￿ f (t)]
￿ 0, for all s;t 2 S, as is well-known,
R
gdv = E ^ P(f) [g] =
Pn











With these preliminaries now in place, consider the following CEU preference
relation with a capacity ￿ that can be written in the form ￿ = ￿￿+(1 ￿ ￿) ~ ￿; where
￿ is a convex capacity (and hence its conjugate, ~ ￿, is concave). Ja¤ray and Philippe
[9] (hereafter JP) show that such a preference relation may be represented by the
function
V (f) = ￿min
P2C
EP [f] + (1 ￿ ￿)max
P2C
EP [f],
where C is the core of ￿, that is the set of probability measures that dominate ￿.
That is,
C = fP 2 ￿(S) : P (E) ￿ ￿(E), for all E ￿ Sg.
This family of preferences may be viewed as a generalization of the Hurwicz
preferences analysed in the previous section. To see that Hurwicz preferences are a
special case, consider the unanimity capacity ￿0, for which ￿0 (E) = 0, if E 6= S. Let
￿1 denote the conjugate capacity of ￿0. By de…nition it follows that for all E 6= ?,
￿1 (E) = 1. We shall take the Hurwicz capacity with parameter ￿ in [0;1] to be the









f (s) + (1 ￿ ￿)max
s2S
f (s) = V H
￿ (f).
9For the more general JP-form ￿ = ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ~ ￿, where C ￿ ￿(S), we can in-
terpret this as a situation in which the individual now has some information about
the process determining the state of nature, as represented by the probability distri-
butions in C. The parameter ￿ again measures the DM’s ambiguity-attitude since
s/he allocates weight ￿ (resp. 1￿￿) to the least (resp. most) favourable probability
distribution in C. But as our next result shows, for this subclass of ￿-MEU prefer-
ences, if n > 2 then we …nd that it is possible that axiom 7 is satis…ed only if ￿ = 1
or 0. More generally, for the class of CEU preferences, axiom 7 holds if and only if ￿
is either convex or concave.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose n > 2. Let % admit a CEU representation with associated
capacity ￿. Then % satis…es axiom 7 if and only if ￿ is either convex or concave.
Proof. Let O denote the set of orderings of the state space, that is, the set of
one-to-one mappings from S to f1;:::;ng. For each ordering of states o 2 O, let Po










o￿1 (1);:::;o￿1 (i ￿ 1)
￿￿
, for i = 2;:::;n. GMM show that for a CEU preference
relation D is the convex hull of the set fPo : o 2 Og.
Fix an act f. Let P (f) = argminP2D EP [f], let ￿ P (f) = argmax P2DEP [f].
Since S is …nite, there are a …nite number of extremal points of D: Hence for a
generic act f, the functions P (f) and ￿ P (f) are constant on a neighbourhood of f.
Consider an extremal point ~ P of D: Then ~ P = ^ P (f) for all f in a set of
comonotonic acts. Since a set of comonotonic acts contains an open set, we may
…nd one such act f which is generic. Since axiom 7 is satis…ed,
































Let g = f + ￿y; where kyk = 1: For ￿ su¢ciently small, ^ P (f) = ^ P (g), P (f) = P (g)
and ￿ P (f) = ￿ P (g): Thus













































Since this holds for all g in a set of full rank,
^ P (f) = ￿P (f) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ P (f).
However ^ P (f) is an extremal point of D; which implies that ￿ = 1 or ￿ = 0: If ￿ = 1
(resp. 0) then ￿ is convex (resp. concave).
4 CONCLUSION
This paper has shown that there are no preferences in the intersection of the CEU and
￿-MEU models which satisfy GMM’s axiomatisation of ￿-MEU for 0 < ￿ < 1: The
cases ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1 have already been axiomatised. However CEU preferences have
some properties not shared by ￿-MEU preferences. For instance CEU preferences
cannot display a strict preference for randomisation while ￿-MEU preferences can,
(see [2]). Thus it remains an open question which preferences satisfy GMM’s axioms
for 0 < ￿ < 1:
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